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Citizenship is one of the main methods that governments use
to delineate which persons have certain rights and which do not. In
Japan, like in many other countries, citizenship also serves to
indicate who ‘belongs’ under the moniker of Japanese. In recent
years, more and more children are being born as dual citizens
between Japan and another country. Migrant workers in Japan are
increasingly seeking a similar dual citizenship status to gain the
same rights as native Japanese citizens. However, the Japanese
government has artfully crafted its Nationality Law over its 100 plus
years of existence to permit the former ‘at-birth’ citizens to have
those rights while making it functionally impossible for the latter to
ever gain them.
This Comment argues that both internal and external
influences from the Nationality Law’s origin in the nineteenth
century through today have, against the global trend to expand
citizenship opportunities, maintained the status quo of reserving
Japanese citizenship for ethnic Japanese. Analyzing the history of
the Law, challenges to it over the years, and the current legal
justifications for its continued restrictive provisions, it appears that
the conception of citizenship may be one of the few aspects of
Japanese society that has withstood foreign influence.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 21, 2021, the Tokyo District Court ruled that
Japanese citizens living abroad who naturalized in their adoptive
country cannot retain their Japanese citizenship. 1 The court upheld
Article 11 of the Nationality Law, which automatically revokes
Japanese citizenship when a Japanese citizen naturalizes in another
country,2 as constitutional under this holding.3 The reasoning of the
government in oral argument and the opinion of the court, however,
was couched in generic language that could be used to apply strict
enforcement against at-birth dual citizens in Japan, not just against
prospective by-choice dual citizens as the plaintiffs were here.4
Specifically, the concerns of double voting opportunities and
conflict-of-obligations that harm the Japanese national interest were
raised as justifications for a prohibition on dual citizenship.5 The
plaintiffs reacted to the decision by noting that involuntary
expatriation under the Nationality Law forced “only Japanese
nationals gaining foreign citizenship abroad to follow the rule on
dual nationality, while ambiguity cloaks those at home.” The
discrepancy in enforcement of the Nationality Law on prospective
by-choice dual citizens (those who seek dual nationality through
naturalization) compared to at-birth dual citizens (those who, under

1

Court Rules in Favor of Japan’s Ban on Dual Nationality, KYODO NEWS (Jan. 21,
2021), https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2021/01/543d5b467dd5-japan-court-rules-banon-multiple-nationality-constitutional.html [https://perma.cc/TMV9-NPZZ].
2
Kokuseki hō [Nationality Law], Law No. 88 of 2008, art. 11, para. 1 (Japan).
3
Court Rules in Favor, supra note 1.
4
Id.
5
Id.
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the laws of two nations, are citizens of each at birth) is well
recognized among scholars.6
The government and the court’s line of argumentation in the
context of the known inequalities of the Nationality Law highlights
a problem that remains unaddressed in the current literature in this
field. Namely, parsing out the reasons why the Nationality Law has
been enforced more strictly on prospective by-choice dual citizens
compared to at-birth ones. This issue is unique in the field of
citizenship law since the Nationality Law’s nominal restriction on
dual citizenship of any kind is anomalous within Asia, where the
recent trend is still against dual citizenship, and is largely out of step
with current Western citizenship practices permitting dual
citizenship of any kind.7
This Comment will demonstrate that, during Japan’s
Western-inspired era of nation building that gave birth to a Japanese
conception of citizenship, it became inextricably tied to ethnicity.
Even as conceptions of citizenship elsewhere in the world began to
move away from such an ethnic basis (and as domestic and
international pressures pushed Japan to follow suit), Japan remains
anomalous among other countries in having functionally maintained
that only ethnic Japanese may be citizens. 8 Therefore, to avoid
changing the law to disrupt this status quo while ensuring at-birth
ethnically Japanese dual citizens are still able to enjoy the rights and
privileges of citizenship, Japan has constructed legal ‘proxies’ or
‘loopholes’ for them. Non-Japanese who wish to be naturalized in
Japan while maintaining their native citizenship, particularly
migrant workers,9 are simply offered no proxy. This permits the
government to truthfully state that dual citizenship of any kind is
prohibited while ensuring that a fine line is drawn between ethnic
6

Mie Murazumi, Japan’s Laws on Dual Nationality in the Context of a Globalized
World, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 415, 424–25 n. 86 (2000).
7
See Maarten Vink et al., The International Diffusion of Expatriate Dual
Citizenship, 7 MIGRATION STUD. 362, 369–70 (2019) (noting that dual citizenship by
naturalization elsewhere is recognized by all North American countries, most Central and
Southern American, Oceanian, and European countries, and in a majority of African and
Asian countries).
8
Id. at 369.
9
See generally Erin Aeran Chung & Daisy Kim, Citizenship and Marriage in a
Globalizing World: Multicultural Families and Monocultural Nationality Laws in Korea
and Japan, 19 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 195, 204–06 (2012) (illustrating the exponential
increase of legal and illegal migrant workers flowing into Japan since the 1970s).
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Japanese and foreigners in terms of social and legal recognition as
Japanese.
Part II of this Comment will define citizenship as a social
construct, noting its centrality to building a national identity. It will
also discuss the legal development of citizenship, having begun in
the West, and the circumstances that gave rise to legally recognized
dual citizenship in these countries, using the United States as an
example. Part III will explore the origin of citizenship in Japan
from both a social and legal lens. It will follow the development of
the law from its inception in the nineteenth century to today,
culminating in the 2021 Tokyo District Court ruling. This historical
background will inform Part IV, which will discuss whether Japan’s
conception of citizenship (as reflected in the Nationality Law) has
changed since its inception, considering whether either domestic or
international pressures to do so were present and have succeeded or
not. It will also lay out the concept of ‘proxies’ or ‘loopholes’
offered to at-birth dual citizens, specifically in the context of voting
rights, to show that an active decision has been made to preserve
Japan’s conception of citizenship as based primarily in ethnicity.
Part V will conclude.

II.

THE CITIZENSHIP PRINCIPLE

The two most common formulations of citizenship are jus
soli and jus sanguinis. A jus soli system grants citizenship to all
persons born in the territory of a country, while a jus sanguinis
system grants citizenship to all persons born to parents who are
citizens of that country. Given these dominant systems, dual
citizenship tends to occur when a child is born in a jus soli country
to a parent who is a citizen of a jus sanguinis country.10 It may also
occur when a child is born to parents who each hold a different
citizenship from jus sanguinis countries.11 Furthermore, one can,
where permitted, obtain dual citizenship through naturalization in a
10
Chin Kim & Stephen R. Fox, The Legal Status of Amerasian Children in Japan: A
Study of Conflict of Nationality Laws, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 35, 38 (1978). The authors
also note that a child born in a jus sanguinis country with parents from a jus soli country
gains no citizenship and is rendered stateless at birth. The issue of statelessness in Japan,
focused on in the author’s piece at length, is complex enough to merit its own paper, so it
will not be addressed here.
11
Tanja Brøndsted Sejersen, “I Vow to Thee My Countries”: The Expansion of Dual
Citizenship in the 21st Century, 42 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 523, 529 (2008).
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foreign country.12 Part II.A will lay out how citizenship is
considered from a social lens and Part II.B will explore the legal
development of citizenship and the emergence of dual citizenship,
taking the United States as an example.
A.

Citizenship as a Social Construct

Citizenship within the political science and related literature
continues to have a floating definition, but one possible definition
(with sufficient generality) was offered by Claire Skinner: “A
citizen is a person who has membership within a state and has the
rights and privileges of that state, which means that he or she is also
beholden to that state’s laws.” 13 However, other scholars would
also attribute various extra-legal benefits of citizen status, such as an
“implied sense of community and belonging.”14 It is this addition to
the concept of citizenship as a whole that merits its division into a
social and legal construct. While some see the social benefit of
citizenship as a net good for establishing a unified and equal polity,
it is important to recognize that citizenship, since its inception,15 has
served three key purposes: to define, to delineate, and to exclude.
Citizenship has served a defining function since its origins in
ancient Greek society.16 In those days, citizenship was defined
markedly similar as it is today, asserting the rights and privileges
that citizens are granted.17 It also, at least during Aristotle’s time,
defined clan status and religious affiliation. 18 On the other hand,
citizenship has also served to define, by negative (or sometimes
positive) inference, who is not a citizen. While each nation may
vary in how it conceives citizenship, citizen children are taught at a
young age to distinguish citizens from foreigners and to conclude
that, by definition, foreigners are from birth simply different. 19
The government, having established the definition of
citizenship itself, is then able to use these definitions to delineate
12
13

Id.
Claire Skinner, Birthright Citizenship, 1 IMMIGR. & MIGRATION: IN CONTEXT 89, 89

(2018).
14
15
16
17
18
19

Kyra Babakian, Citizenship, 1 IMMIG. & MIGRATION: IN CONTEXT 135, 135 (2018).
DIMITRY KOCHENOV, CITIZENSHIP 241 (2019).
Babakian, supra note 14, at 135.
Id.
KOCHENOV, supra note 15, at 32.
Id. at 51.
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between citizens and non-citizens. 20 This makes explicit what is
implicit in a nation’s definition of citizenship—non-citizens do not
deserve the same rights.21
Line drawing also ensures that
citizenship status does not automatically correlate with residency in
the country.22 This reveals the power that a legal definition of
citizenship has to legitimize the social construct it creates—noncitizens who grew up in a given country, speak the language, and
for all intents and purposes think of themselves as part of the
citizenry will often find themselves on the other side of the line and
therefore in the social ‘other’ group. 23
With who is a citizen or not defined and the rights and
privileges of such status strictly segregated, this social perception of
citizenship can then be used to exclude the non-citizen group. 24
One waning yet still present exclusionary category is race. 25 This
exclusion manifests through the active denial of the rights and
privileges offered to citizens, particularly in informing legislation
that perpetuates this exclusion.26 Prohibitions on dual nationality, as
explored throughout the rest of this Comment, are one example of a
policy arising out of exclusion based on race.27 The following
section will explore how citizenship as a legal construct has
developed out of this chain of define-delineate-exclude, in other
words the social conception of citizenship, with an emphasis on dual
citizenship.
B.

Citizenship as a Legal Construct

Before the Greek-originating concept of citizenship was
codified in the West, an individual’s loyalty was based on their
feudal affiliation grounded in a notion of “perpetual allegiance” to

20

Id. at 59.
Id.
22
Id. at 58.
23
Id. at 30.
24
Id. at 6–8, 200.
25
See id. at 6–8, 96–97, 101, 103 (describing how race, a formerly popular way to
exclude citizen from non-citizen, has decreased in use over time, but has not disappeared
entirely).
26
Id. at 51; Babakian, supra note 14.
27
See KOCHENOV, supra note 15, at 113 (“Dual nationality is prohibited when the
state reacts, unreasonably, to a neighboring state extending nationality to its resident ethnic
minorities . . . or tries to limit naturalizations . . . “).
21
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their lord.28 Once sovereigns began to take unilateral power in
European states, this concept of allegiance to the lord transferred to
the sovereign.29 This meant, however, that when an individual
moved to the realm of another sovereign, they entered into a
perpetual allegiance with that sovereign, essentially creating the first
instances of dual citizenship.30 Under this system, citizenship could
not be forfeited.31 When European states codified this system as jus
sanguinis principles to prevent the kind of accidental dual
citizenship that had happened previously, they did so with an
aversion to by-choice dual citizenship as producing conflicting
loyalties.32
These European policies conflicted with American jus soli
principles as they applied to European migrants to the United States
who had naturalized, therefore granting them dual citizenship. 33 At
first, European countries attempted to force compliance with
conscription requirements on their citizens, one example being the
British who took American sailors off American ships and absorbed
them into the Royal Navy.34 The United States and these European
nations soon signed a series of treaties (known as the Bancroft
treaties after the U.S. politician who facilitated them) to permit
voluntary expatriation, allowing these dual citizens to renounce their
European citizenship and the requirements it imposed.35 These
treaties, however, did not end the dual citizenship problem, since
many countries still worried that those who held on to their dual
citizenship had questionable loyalties.36
The twentieth century saw increased movement of people
internationally, contributing to the phenomenon of “globalism” that
began to chip away at the concerns dual citizenship had posed for
sovereign nations.37 This is not to say that these changes occurred
overnight—two international conventions in 1930 and 1963 both
28
PETER J. SPIRO, AT HOME IN TWO COUNTRIES: THE PAST
CITIZENSHIP 13–14 (2016).
29
Murazumi, supra note 6, at 429.
30
Id.
31
SPIRO, supra note 28, at 14.
32
Murazumi, supra note 6, at 431.
33
Id. at 429–30.
34
SPIRO, supra note 28, at 15–16.
35
Murazumi, supra note 6, at 430.
36
Id.
37
Id.
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served to stem dual citizenship in Europe. Further, George
Bancroft, driver of the Bancroft treaties, stated that one should “ . . .
as soon tolerate a man with two wives as a man with two
countries.”38 In the United Kingdom, however, a 1948 Act of
Parliament permitted dual citizenship of any kind, whether at birth
or by choice through naturalization.39 Similar laws were adopted in
France in 1973 and in Canada in 1976.40 This expansion of dual
citizenship spread over Europe through two more international
agreements in 1993 and 1997.41
As of 2017, roughly 75% of European countries permit some
form of dual citizenship and about 91% of countries in the Americas
do.42 In Asia, however, only about 65% of countries permit any
kind of dual citizenship, and within that group only a minority limit
it to at-birth dual citizens, Japan being one, in turn barring dual
citizenship through voluntary naturalization. 43 This is indicative of
a purely jus sanguinis policy trend in Asia, bucking contemporary
European citizenship principles that have largely merged jus soli
and jus sanguinis principles.44 One possible explanation for this
shift in Asia is an inherent conception of citizenship not as a right,
but as a privilege.45 Similar notions continue to exist outside of
Asia, one example being in Denmark (and to an extent, Germany)
where the concept of the “homogeneous nation” continues to
hamper dual citizenship.46 The Danish rationale is, in part, that dual
citizenship signals that one is not “fully committed to being
Danish,” bringing into question whether they should be permitted to
vote in Danish elections or run for office.47

38

Id. at 439–40; Sejersen, supra note 10, at 530.
Murazumi, supra note 6, at 435–36.
40
Id. at 436.
41
Id. at 440.
42
Vink, supra note 7, at 370.
43
Id. at 369.
44
Kristin Surak, Convergence in Foreigners’ Rights and Citizenship Policies? A Look
at Japan, 42 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 550, 550 (2008); Jessie Yeung, These Asian Countries
are Giving Dual Citizens an Ultimatum on Nationality—and Loyalty, CNN (Mar. 15,
2021),
https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/asia-dual-citizenship-intl-hnkdst/index.html#:~:text=Japan%20and%20China%20are%20giving,%2D%2D%20and%20l
oyalty%20%7C%20CNN%20Travel [https://perma.cc/35F7-VHXC].
45
Yeung, supra note 44.
46
Sejersen, supra note 11, at 541–42.
47
Id.
39
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In Europe and the Americas generally, the driving force
behind high rates of unconditional dual citizenship is a political
desire to integrate the migrant class into the polity without forcing
them to face the legal, social, and economic consequences
renunciation of their native citizenship would bring.48 This comes,
in part, from these nations having modified their national identity to
include a description of themselves as nations of immigrants. 49
Dual citizenship with a European/American country (or a developed
country generally) is particularly enticing to those coming from
countries that lack economic opportunities or security. 50 This
reflects the contemporary notion that dual citizenship is not a matter
of identity, but rather a matter of socioeconomic value. 51 The
multilingual abilities and cultural understandings that come with
dual citizenship also import a scarcity that makes the socioeconomic
value of dual citizenship more desirable for employers. 52 The next
section will explore the development of the legal construct of
citizenship in the United States as a key example of the Western
conception of citizenship. This analysis is important as Japan’s
Nationality Law has, since its inception, been significantly impacted
by citizenship policy in the U.S.53
1.

A Western Example: The United States

Citizenship in the United States is grounded in two distinct
constitutional clauses: Article I, Section 8—the Naturalization
Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1— the Citizenship
Clause.54 The former grants Congress an affirmative power to
48

Sejersen, supra note 11, at 534; Murazumi, supra note 6, at 441–42.
Surak, supra note 44, at 554.
50
See Yossi Harpaz, Compensatory Citizenship: Dual Nationality as a Strategy of
Global Upward Mobility, 45 J. OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUD. 897 (2018) (explaining
that a second nationality or “compensatory citizenship” is sought by migrants to make up
for lacking opportunities and securities offered by their home country).
51
Aoife Wilkinson, Forfeiting Citizenship, Forfeiting Identity? Multiethnic and
Multiracial Japanese Youth in Australia and the Japanese Nationality Law, 12 NEW
VOICES IN JAPANESE STUD. 21, 29 (2020) (finding that selective forfeiture of citizenship as
cultural capital may produce more favorable economic outcomes).
52
See id. at 35–36 (finding that mixed Japanese youths strategically align their choice
of citizenship with perceived future career outcomes).
53
See infra Part 0 (discussing how the Nationality Law, both pre- and post-war, often
changed in reaction to interactions with the U.S.).
54
Kim & Fox, supra note 10, at 44–45.
49
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create the laws for naturalization as an American citizen, while the
latter establishes national citizenship for all persons born in the
United States and all persons naturalized. 55 The power under
Article I, Section 8 was not exercised, however, until the
Naturalization Act of 1790.56 Prior to this, citizenship in the United
States in terms of both birthright and naturalization defaulted to
state law.57 In this sense, the Framers had no defined concept of
citizenship in mind when they drafted the Constitution. 58 Under the
1790 Act, only federal naturalization procedures were established,
leaving birthright citizenship to the states.59
Congress adopted a new Nationality Act in 1795, which
added the requirement that an “oath of renunciation and allegiance”
be pledged when one naturalizes as a U.S. citizen—something that
still exists today.60 The oath contains explicit language that an
individual who naturalizes renounces any prior foreign
allegiances.61 In essence, it worked to offer European immigrants
full protection under U.S. law against efforts made by their home
countries to invoke the immigrants’ liabilities as citizens of their
home countries.62 The renunciation of one’s former citizenship,
especially by former British subjects, was central to the protections
offered to prisoners of war during the War of 1812.63 In the eyes of
the British (and other European countries), neither an immigrant’s
naturalization in the U.S. nor their voluntary renunciation of British
citizenship through the oath were recognized. 64 This, together with
the U.S. position that both these actions were recognized, reflected a
55

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Dual Citizenship, Birthright Citizenship, and the Meaning of Sovereignty: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Immigr., Border Sec., and Claims of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 77 (2005) (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee, Ranking Member,
H. Subcomm. on Immigr., Border Sec., and Claims).
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
See id. at 24 (statement of John Fonte, Senior Fellow, The Hudson Institute)
(stating that naturalized Americans have taken the oath for over 200 years which requires
renunciation of prior allegiances).
61
Id.
62
SPIRO, supra note 28, at 15–16.
63
Dual Citizenship, Birthright Citizenship, and the Meaning of Sovereignty: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Immigr., Border Sec., and Claims of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 25 (2005) (statement of John Fonte, Senior Fellow, The Hudson
Institute).
64
Id.
56
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common trend in the West that dual citizenship through
naturalization (i.e. by choice) was impermissible.
Birthright citizenship (or at-birth citizenship) was not
federally established until the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which read:
“All persons born in the United States, and not subject to any
foreign power . . . are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States.”65 This portion of the Civil Rights Act was later subsumed
into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, which states
similarly that “[a]ll persons naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States . . . .”66 The language of “jurisdiction” has been interpreted
to mean that any individual born on U.S. or territorial soil
automatically becomes a U.S. citizen. 67
This expansion of
citizenship opportunity produced more lanes for a child to be born
with dual citizenship, but, like many other countries, the official
U.S. policy worked to limit dual citizenship of any kind. Until the
mid-twentieth century, for example, an American dual citizen who
exercised any of the legal rights of their foreign citizenship
automatically lost their American citizenship.68
This policy, however, met resistance in the form of three
seminal Supreme Court cases that expanded the political rights of
dual citizens both in the United States and in their other country of
citizenship. In Schneider v. Rusk, the court held that involuntarily
stripping U.S. citizenship from a naturalized American citizen who
lived abroad, but not from an at-birth American citizen who lived
abroad, was unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause.69 The Nationality Act of 1940, which established
this provision, was held to have discriminated against naturalized
U.S. citizens and treated them as lesser-than compared to at-birth
U.S. citizens, for which the court held there could be no

65

Id. at 78 (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee, Ranking Member, H. Subcomm.
on Immigr., Border Sec., and Claims).
66
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
67
Dual Citizenship, Birthright Citizenship, and the Meaning of Sovereignty: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Immigr., Border Sec., and Claims of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 8 (2005) (statement of Rep. Hostettler, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on
Immigr., Border Sec., and Claims). There remains debate among those who testified at this
hearing whether “jurisdictional” means U.S. territory or allegiance to the U.S.
68
Id. at 43 (statement of Peter J. Spiro, Dean, Univ. of Ga. School of Law).
69
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168–69 (1964).
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justification.70 Countering the zeitgeist against dual citizenship,
Justice Douglas stated that, “[l]iving abroad, whether the citizen be
naturalized or native born, is no badge of lack of allegiance and in
no way evidences a voluntary renunciation of nationality and
allegiance.”71
Three years after Schneider, the Court ruled in Afroyim v.
Rusk that neither an at-birth nor a by-choice dual citizen who votes
in a foreign election can constitutionally have their U.S. citizenship
involuntarily revoked.72 The court noted that the Citizenship Clause
in the Fourteenth Amendment was likely meant to ensure that states
did not forcefully revoke the citizenship of Black Americans. 73 The
court held that this right of a secure citizenship applied to all U.S.
citizens, and that the government had no power to revoke U.S.
citizenship unilaterally.74 The court also overruled Perez v.
Brownell, a case from ten years prior which held that voting in a
foreign election constitutionally permitted the government to revoke
at-birth U.S. citizenship.75 Both Schneider and Afroyim clarified
that the U.S. policy to involuntarily revoke U.S. citizenship
whenever a dual citizen of any kind actively interacted with their
other country of citizenship was unconstitutional.
In Rogers v. Bellei, decided three years after Afroyim, the
Court walked back its grand statement about secure citizenship and
instead held that any legislation seeking to enact involuntary
expatriation was constitutional as long as it survived heightened
scrutiny.76 The appellee in Bellei was born in Italy to an Italian
father and an American mother.77 Under a combination of an Italian
jus soli policy and a U.S. jus sanguinis statute that permitted a child
born abroad to a U.S. citizen who had lived in the U.S. for a
prescribed period to obtain U.S. citizenship, Bellei was a dual
citizen.78 When he was notified that his U.S. citizenship had been
revoked due to a failure to meet the residency requirement needed to
maintain U.S. citizenship, which has since been removed from the
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Id.
Id.
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967).
Id. at 262.
Id. at 266–67.
Id. at 268; Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 62 (1958).
Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 831 (1971).
Id. at 817–18.
Id. at 818.
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law, he challenged his involuntary expatriation under both Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. 79 The Court held that as long
as the Congressional power used to revoke U.S. citizenship from a
dual national was not “unreasonable, arbitrary, or unlawful,” it
remained constitutional under either version of Due Process. 80 As
applied to Bellei, the Court held that Congress had legitimate
concerns about conflicting loyalties and that a residency
requirement confirmed one’s commitment to their duties as an
American citizen.81 Since this was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unlawful, the rescindment of Bellei’s citizenship was therefore
proper.82
The decision in Bellei, resting on concerns of competing
loyalties, reflected the continued aversion to dual citizenship of any
kind in the United States which, like in Europe, did not shift
towards liberalization until the late twentieth century.83 In 1986,
Congress enacted an amended statute that required an affirmative
statement to renounce U.S. citizenship when one does an act in their
other country of citizenship that, under the pre-Schneider expansive
or post-Bellei limited schemes, would have permitted the
government to revoke U.S. citizenship.84 This means that, as
opposed to other countries (like Japan) that presume one intends to
give up his/her “native” citizenship when he/she voluntarily
naturalizes elsewhere, a U.S. citizen who does so is assumed to
intend on retaining his/her American citizenship.85 Under this
structure, therefore, dual citizenship at-birth and by-choice—either
by naturalization in the U.S. or a U.S. citizen who naturalizes
elsewhere—is legally permitted.

79

Id. at 820.
Id. at 831.
81
Id. at 832.
82
Id. at 836.
83
Sejersen, supra note 11, at 534.
84
Murazumi, supra note 6, at 437–38. Under this amended statute, even U.S. citizens
who assume office abroad cannot have their U.S. citizenship revoked unless they actively
do so themselves. Some prominent examples are Boris Johnson, Prime Minister of the UK,
who gave his up voluntarily and Arturs Krišjānis Kariņš, Prime Minister of Latvia, who
has kept his.
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Id. at 436.
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CITIZENSHIP IN JAPAN

This section is divided into three parts to reflect three
significant eras of evolution in Japan’s conception of citizenship.
Part III.A covers the 1899 nationality law, the first of its kind in
Japan, and its progeny through World War II. Part III.B looks at the
adoption of the Nationality Law in 1950 and the series of rapid
adjustments it underwent during the U.S. occupation of Japan.
Finally, Part III.C examines the developments since the end of
occupation.
A.

The 1899 Nationality Law

Principles of citizenship did not enter the Japanese political
consciousness in a legal sense until after the Meiji Restoration in
1868.86 During this period of nation building, Japan adopted several
Western notions of statehood, including a national flag in 1870, 87 a
national anthem in 1888,88 and citizenship in 1873.89 This 1873
statute permitted a foreign wife of a Japanese man to obtain
citizenship through marriage. It also implemented the jus sanguinis
model, emulating the system used by most European states at the
time,90 which carried implications that children born in Japan to two
foreign parents were not Japanese citizens. 91 This original law was
adopted in part to advance the Meiji government’s “internal
colonization” efforts to integrate the Ryukyuan and Ainu peoples
into the Japanese polity by granting them equal treatment as
Japanese citizens.92 In doing so, however, it also adopted European

86
Catherine Lu, Toshihiro Menju & Melissa Williams, Japan and “The Other”:
Reconceiving Japanese Citizenship in the Era of Globalization, 29 ASIAN PERSP. 99, 103–4
(2005); Eric C. Han, The Nationality Law and Entry Restrictions of 1899: Constructing
Japanese Identity Between China and the West, 4 Japan F. 521, 522 (2018).
87
YASUTAKA TERUOKA, HINOMARU, KIMIGAYO NO NARITACHI [ORIGINS OF THE
JAPANESE FLAG AND NATIONAL ANTHEM] 39 (1991); see also NORMA FIELD, IN THE REALM
OF A DYING EMPEROR 69 (1991) (noting that Okinawa first received the new national flag
in 1873).
88
Teruoka, supra note 87, at 59–60.
89
Kim & Fox, supra note 10, at 40.
90
Murazumi, supra note 6, at 418.
91
Kim & Fox, supra note 10, at 41.
92
Lu, supra note 86, at 104.
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conceptions of citizenship as a way to categorize a superior class of
ethnic individuals.93
A comprehensive nationality law enacted in 1899
consolidated a series of codes on nationality into a single piece of
legislation.94 The emphasis behind the formalization of nationality
arose in part out of pressures from Western nations that traded in
Japanese ports because they wanted Japan to permit their nationals
to move freely.95 The belief was that a law emulating those in the
West was required for Westerners to acknowledge and respect
Japan’s sovereignty as it opened up to foreign influence. 96 It was
also out of this desire to meet Western expectations that the 1899
law adopted then-common jus sanguinis principles.97 The law was
written in a way, however, to address the worry that Chinese
laborers were inundating Japan.98 Some policymakers in Japan
argued that the Chinese would take advantage of potential
naturalization and “inundate Japan and take jobs from Japanese
workers.”99 Others argued that the Chinese would “harm Japan’s
customs and morals, and pollute the Japanese bloodline through
intermarriage.”100
This intentional desire to exclude Chinese and foreigners
generally from interfering with the existing Japanese conception of
citizenship (i.e., their social understanding of what it means to be
Japanese), is reflected in the text of the law. Deliberation in the
Diet shows that there was an intentional framing of the text to
“remove any implication that foreigners had a right to
naturalization.”101 Further, among the series of conditions required
for naturalization,102 records show that the requirement of “being of

93

Id.
Han, supra note 86, at 527–28.
95
Id. at 523.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 529.
98
Id. at 525; see generally KOCHENOV, supra note 15, at 112 (“States around the
world simply decide [to change their citizenship laws] based on what appears to be in their
best interests in terms of financial or other gains from the body of citizens combined with
the reinforcement of the key prejudices in society.”).
99
Han, supra note 8694, at 525.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 529.
102
See infra Part 0 (listing off the conditions for naturalization under the 1899
nationality law).
94
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good character” was left intentionally vague.103 The hope was that,
in addition to naturalization being at the discretion of the Interior
Minister, this language would make it prohibitively difficult for
foreigners to naturalize under the law.104
The 1899 law also added that renunciation of one’s Japanese
citizenship was only possible by voluntary acquisition of a foreign
nationality.105 Under this structure, people born to Japanese fathers
in a jus soli country and therefore obtained dual citizenship could
not renounce their Japanese citizenship because their non-Japanese
nationality was not “voluntarily” acquired.106 This nationality law,
however, aggravated anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States
where children of Japanese immigrants were born as dual citizens
but were unable to renounce their Japanese citizenship, inviting
questions of divided loyalties.107 In reaction, Japan amended the
nationality law in 1916 to conditionally permit dual citizens to
renounce their Japanese citizenship.108 Any request to do so had to
be approved by the government, and any men over the age of
seventeen had to fulfill their conscription duties prior to
renunciation.109
The nationality law was again amended in 1924,110 the last
time before the Second World War, to directly address the issue of
dual citizenship. This amendment introduced a parental recognition
requirement where Japanese fathers of children born in an
enumerated list of jus soli countries (including the United States)
had to register their children on their family registry within fourteen
days of birth to retain the child’s Japanese citizenship.111
Additionally, it allowed those who already had dual citizenship to
renounce their Japanese citizenship at will, 112 doing away with the
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Han, supra note 8694, at 530.
Id.
105
Kim & Fox, supra note 9, at 41; Murazumi, supra note 6, at 418.
106
Murazumi, supra note 6, at 418.
107
Id. at 418–19.
108
Id. at 419.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 420.
111
See id. at 420 (noting that the 1924 amendment required recognition, which likely
meant registration of a child in the father’s family registry at the closest
embassy/consulate).
112
Id.
104
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government discretion and conscription requirements of the
previous amendment.
B.

The Occupational Nationality Law

The Japanese government did not revisit the nationality law
again until 1950 when, while under U.S. occupation, it adopted a
new Nationality Law.113 This law, however, retained the language
of the 1924 version and only changed the jus soli enumerates by
expanding the list to all jus soli countries.114 A key consideration at
the time of drafting was how to categorize former colonial subjects
from Korea who were still living in Japan. During the colonial era,
Koreans were considered citizens of Japan under both Japanese law
and the international consensus.115 During the occupation, this was
also the U.S. occupational government’s (hereinafter “GHQ”)
position,116 which would not change until the formal dissolution of
the Japanese Empire after the signing of the San Francisco Peace
Treaty in 1952.117 During occupation, the U.S. government
believed that no formal decision on the citizenship of Koreans in
Japan should be made until Japan and a (hopefully) unified Korea
could meet at the negotiation table.118 As the tensions leading up to
the Korean War began to dash hopes of such a meeting, concerns
arose among Japanese politicians about whether Koreans with
Japanese citizenship were truly loyal to Japan. 119
Under pressure from Japanese officials, while still
recognizing that many Koreans in Japan were born in Japan and had
known no other home, GHQ began debates over how to facilitate
forced repatriation of Koreans with Japanese citizenship.120 To do
so, GHQ sought to delegitimize Korean claims to Japanese
citizenship by attacking both its social and legal prongs. First, a key
113

Id.
Id. at 421.
115
Han, supra note 8694, at 522. Also note that Taiwanese were also subject to similar
confusing citizenship status, but their numbers were relatively small compared to Koreans
to the extent that the U.S. occupational administration did not concern itself as much with
their status.
116
Simon Nantais, Race to Subversion: Nationality and Koreans in Occupied Japan,
1945–1952, 39 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 819, 821 (2015).
117
Han, supra note 86, at 539.
118
Nantais, supra note 116, at 823.
119
Id. at 827, 829.
120
Id. at 830–31.
114
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development was the establishment of the Republic of Korea
(“ROK”) and its adoption of a Nationality Act, permitting
citizenship to all Koreans “irrespective of domicile.” 121 With this in
its pocket, the GHQ targeted the social prong of Koreans with
Japanese citizenship by setting out to “alienize” them to the point
that they would voluntarily repatriate as Korean citizens. Legally,
GHQ began to characterize Koreans in Japan as “undesirables” and
“subversives” who were now, by its account, “Korean nationals”
who ought to be deported to the ROK.122 Consequently, Koreans
were now faced with the burden of “explaining why they had
deliberately retained their Japanese nationality” instead of acquiring
Korean citizenship,123 amounting to a sort of loyalty test.
These efforts ultimately resulted in the 1952 amendment of
the Nationality Law which stripped Japanese colonial citizens of
their citizenship, rendering Koreans and Taiwanese living in Japan
stateless.124 This statelessness occurred because the signing of the
San Francisco Peace Treaty dissolving Japanese claims over Korea
and Taiwan occurred when the U.S. still did not recognize either
state on the Korean peninsula or in China.125
C.

Recent Developments in the Nationality Law

In 1985, prompted by Japan’s signing of the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, the government amended the Nationality Law to
expand the passing of jus sanguinis citizenship to Japanese
mothers.126 Knowing this would increase instances of dual
citizenship, this amendment added two new restrictions. First, the
parental recognition requirement extended to children born
anywhere, not just in jus soli countries, taking into account the
irregularities in global citizenship laws that create acquisition
loopholes for dual citizenship.127
Second, the “election
requirement” was introduced which mandated that children born as
121

Id. at 832.
Id. at 834–35
123
Id. at 839.
124
Lu, supra note 86, at 106; Surak, supra note 44, at 557–58. Koreans who had their
citizenship revoked and their descendants are commonly known as Zainichi Koreans.
125
Nantais, supra note 116, at 840.
126
Chung & Kim, supra note 9, at 210–11; Murazumi, supra note 6, at 421–22.
127
Murazumi, supra note 6, at 422.
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dual citizens had to renounce one of their citizenships before turning
twenty-two.128
The impetus behind the 1985 amendment was also the result
of internal pressures arising out of increasing rates of migrant
workers entering Japan.129 Naturally, as these migrant workers
integrated into Japanese society, children born to a Japanese parent
(usually father) and a migrant worker parent (usually mother)
presented an issue of potential statelessness. 130 In short, before the
1985 amendment, a child born under the circumstances described
above had to be legally ‘recognized’ by the Japanese parent prior to
birth; otherwise, unless the non-citizen parent could confer their
citizenship to the child under their home country’s laws, the child
would be stateless.131 Apart from the Japanese parent not
recognizing the child, statelessness was also possible where the noncitizen parent was not easily identifiable as a citizen of any
country.132 The amendment and a series of court cases after its
adoption made clear that post-birth recognition and even a
conclusion that “the actual [parent] would probably have recognized
the fetus if the child had not been presumed to be the [parent’s]
child” were sufficient to grant Japanese citizenship.133 The only
judicially enforceable way to prevent such a child from gaining
citizenship is for the state to meet the burden of positively
identifying at least one of the parents, not just establish the high
probability that someone might be the parent, as the old burden
required.134
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Id.
Sumi Shin, Newcomer Migrants: Implications for Japan’s Administration of Social
Services and Nationality, 6 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFFS. 313, 315 (2001–2002).
130
Id. at 343–344.
131
Id. at 343–344, 345.
132
See id. at 343–44 (discussing the Andrew Rees case where a child born to a
Japanese father and a non-citizen mother presumed to be from the Philippines was granted
Japanese citizenship since the state could not meet its burden of affirmatively identifying at
least one of the parents).
133
Id. at 345, 349. It is also interesting to note that, during litigation regarding the
recognition requirement under the 1985 amendment, a plaintiff raised the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Japan is a signatory, that holds
that every child has the right to citizenship and cannot be withheld that right based on
discriminatory grounds. Id. at 347. The court, however, dismissed this assertion and stated
that “[the] ICCPR Committee’s interpretations of the Covenant are not binding upon
Japanese courts.” Id.
134
Id. at 344.
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The most recent amendment to the Nationality Law arose
out of similar pressures the pre-war version faced from individuals
who were disparately impacted by the law. In 2008, after a period
of activism by Zainichi Koreans, Filipino mothers of children born
out of wedlock to Japanese fathers, and the Association of
Multicultural Families (kokusai kekkon wo kangaeru kai) who all
challenged aspects of the Nationality Law in court, the Supreme
Court of Japan ruled on what was called the “Nationality
Affirmation Case.”135 This case also came on the heels of decades
of female migrant workers coming into Japan, which increased the
rates of both mixed race relationships and marriages.136 The court
held that children born to a Japanese father and a foreign mother out
of wedlock could obtain Japanese citizenship. 137 The court also
held that both the marriage and paternal legitimacy recognition
requirements in the 1985 version of the Nationality Law were
unconstitutional on the grounds of engendering discrimination.138
This ruling sparked what became the 2008 amendment to the
Nationality Law which codified this holding into the law. 139
In 2018, eight Japanese citizens who had voluntarily
naturalized in various European countries challenged the
involuntary expatriation upon foreign naturalization clause of the
Nationality Law as violating the Japanese constitution.140 The
clause in question, Article 11 of the Nationality Law, states that “[a]
Japanese national shall lose Japanese nationality when he or she
acquires a foreign nationality by his or her own choice.” 141 The
plaintiffs argued that this infringed on their constitutionally
protected right to “ . . . the pursuit of happiness” and “equal[ity]
under the law.”142 While pieces of the Nationality Act had been
litigated in the past,143 this was the first time the court ruled on
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Wilkinson, supra note 51, at 26.
Chung & Kim, supra note 9, at 205–6.
137
Wilkinson, supra note 51, at 26.
138
Chung & Kim, supra note 9, at 211–12.
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Id. at 211.
140
Court Rules in Favor, supra note 1.
141
Kokuseki hō [Nationaity Law], Law No. 88 of 2008, art. 11, para. 1 (Japan).
142
Court Rules in Favor, supra note 1; NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [Constitution],
art. 13 (Japan); Id. art 14, para. 1.
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See Wilkinson, supra note 51, at 25–26 (describing NGO groups representing
Zainichi Koreans and female migrant workers litigating the National Law piecemeal).
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whether Japanese citizens who obtain a foreign nationality through
voluntary naturalization could remain Japanese citizens. 144
The government argued that the plaintiffs ignored harms to
the “national interest” that dual citizenship allegedly posed to
Japan.145 Specifically, the government noted that dual citizenship
engendered double voting rights and double or conflicting
diplomatic protections.146 In January 2021, the court held for the
government, stating that dual citizenship “could cause conflict in the
rights and obligations between countries, as well as between the
individual and the state.”147
With this history in mind, the following section will analyze
the evolution of the law since the Meiji era to help determine
whether it can be said Japan’s conception of citizenship, both social
and legal, has changed in a significant way and, if it has, to whose
benefit.

IV.

JAPAN’S CONCEPTION OF CITIZENSHIP

At the start, it is helpful to refer back to the text of the
comprehensive nationality law as adopted in 1899. Under this
version of the law, a non-citizen could naturalize if they met the
following five conditions: (1) domicile for five consecutive years;
(2) at least twenty years old and having “legal capacity”; (3) good
conduct and behavior; (4) able to support oneself, and; (5) currently
stateless or will give up one’s existing nationality upon
naturalization.148 These conditions are highlighted because all five
appear, in the same order, in the current Nationality Law.149
Additionally, Article 20 of the 1899 version mirrors, save slight
differences in translation, Article 11 in the current version in
rendering voluntary acquisition of another nationality as an
automatic renunciation of Japanese citizenship.150 Therefore, it
appears (from an objective standpoint) that the central tenants of the

144

Court Rules in Favor, supra note 1.
Id.
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Id.
147
Id.
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GILBERT BOWLES, JAPANESE LAW OF NATIONALITY 2–3 (1915).
149
Kokuseki hō [Nationaity Law], Law No. 88 of 2008, art. 5 (Japan).
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Bowles, supra note 148, at 5; Kokuseki hō [Nationaity Law], Law No. 88 of 2008,
art. 11, para. 1 (Japan).
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law have not changed in over a century. This is not to say, however,
that Japan’s conception of citizenship has not changed at all. 151
A.

Nai Atsu and Gai Atsu

The various amendments since 1950 all demonstrate some
sort of reactionary change, not unlike those the old nationality law
underwent in the early twentieth century,152 in response to domestic
and international pressures (nai atsu and gai atsu, respectively).
The 1952 revision that revoked citizenship from Koreans was the
product of both. Domestically, political worries of insurgency risk
from Koreans prompted policymakers to push the Japanese
government (and GHQ) to take action to permit forced
repatriation.153 To do so legally, this meant having to change the
Nationality Law to revoke former colonial citizenship from Koreans
and Taiwanese.154 Internationally, the onset of the Korean War (and
the Cold War in general) put pressure on GHQ from the U.S.
Government to expel Koreans from Japan to avoid the spread of
communist sympathy in Japan. 155
The 1985 amendment similarly was subject to both domestic
and international pressures. Domestically, the increase in migrant
workers during the 1980s had presented Japanese policy makers
with the following question: “how to handle a foreign population
that fills a need for manual labor but lacks [an] established legal
claim for continued residence, and whose potential for permanent
settlement is considered undesirable, particularly in economic
downturns?”156 Internationally, international agreements to which
Japan was signatory pushed Japan to adopt the principles of those
treaties into their laws.157 However, as evidenced by both the
151

If this was the case, a significant part of this paper would not exist. See infra Part 0.
See supra Part III.0 (noting that issues with Japan-U.S. dual nationality prompted
several revisions of the old nationality law).
153
See Nantais, supra note 116, at 827, 829 (discussing Japanese questions of
Japanese-citizen Koreans’ loyalties).
154
See id. at 834–35 (describing how GHQ began to refer to Koreans as “Korean
nationals” in order to facilitate repatriation).
155
Id. at 827. It is relevant to note that the name of the GHQ committee that ran the
forced repatriation debate was “The Committee on Counter-Measures against Communism
in the Far East.” Id. at 834.
156
Shin, supra note 129, at 315
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See, e.g., id. at 338 n.107 (“The prospect of Japan’s ratification of the UN
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which
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additional restrictions the 1985 amendment placed on potential dual
citizens and the refusal to hold these international agreements as
binding authority in Japanese courts,158 the influence gai atsu has
had on the Nationality Law seems to have waned over time.
The 2008 amendment appeared to arise entirely out of
domestic pressure, albeit from ‘foreigners’ in Japan. Domestic
associations like the Association of Multicultural Families have
taken the charge in challenging the Nationality Law so that more
non-citizen children born and raised in Japan are able to enjoy the
rights of citizenship.159 There continues to be hope, however, that
these sorts of groups may also put pressures on Japan to adopt the
international human rights standards to which Japan remains a
signatory.160 The 2021 Tokyo District Court case may also be seen
as the result of solely domestic pressure as the push to permit bychoice dual citizenship came from Japanese citizens living
abroad.161
B.

Proxies and Loopholes

A key observation to be made from the various revisions of
the Nationality Law is that they have all been in service of a
common goal—to take away citizenship from non-ethnic Japanese
and extend it to ethnic Japanese. The 1952 amendment took it away
from Koreans and Taiwanese, while the 1985 and 2008 amendments
extended it to children who were at least half Japanese. 162 This
pattern reinforces the conception of citizenship ingrained in Japan
since 1899 that citizenship is inexplicably tied to ethnicity. 163 The
base idea around amendments extending the rights and privileges of
citizenship which, in turn, expand the conception of citizenship to
went into force on July 25, 1985, compelled the government to revise the Nationality
Law”).
158
See Murazumi, supra note 6, at 422 (introducing additional provisions added to the
1985 amendment to counteract the increase in the number of dual nationals); see also
supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing the Andrew Rees case where a child
born to a Japanese father and a non-citizen mother presumed to be from the Philippines
was granted Japanese citizenship since the state could not meet its burden of affirmatively
identifying at least one of the parents).
159
Wilkinson, supra note 51, at 26.
160
Shin, supra note 129, at 360.
161
Court Rules in Favor of Japan’s Ban on Dual Nationality, supra note 1.
162
See supra Part 0 (discussing the various amendments to the Nationality Law).
163
Lu, supra note 86, at 104.
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cover ethnic Japanese who might not neatly fit into the requirements
of citizenship and subsequently grant them the rights of citizenship,
is not an uncommon practice; particularly in the realm of voting
rights, some countries have been open to enfranchising non-citizen
residents who arguably fall within the nation’s conception of
citizenship.164
For the purposes of this Comment, I call such an expansion
of a nation’s conception of citizenship and granting of rights of
citizenship to those now included in the social/legal citizenry (at the
expense of maintaining an out-group of non-citizens) as a ‘proxy’ or
‘loophole’ in a country’s nationality law. As mentioned above,
there are examples of states creating proxies for non-citizen
residents who are integrated into the country’s society to enjoy (at
least some of) the rights and privileges of citizenship, particularly
voting.165 However, the trend is not in that direction; these days, the
trend is to expand voting rights to non-resident citizens while
continuing to restrict it from non-citizen residents, ensuring the line
is maintained by formal citizenship status.166 This is the model
Japan continues to follow, and the remainder of this Comment will
explore how the Nationality Law has been crafted, specifically in
the context of voting rights for dual citizens, to maintain that only
ethnic Japanese have the right to vote and, consequently, that the
conception of citizenship in Japan remains ethnically based.
1.

Dual Citizen Voting Rights in Japan

In the 2021 Tokyo District Court case, the government’s
argument that dual citizenship is undesirable because it offers
individuals dual voting rights was not new. This same concern,
supported by the general conflicting loyalties concern held during
the early to mid-twentieth century around the globe, was the
backbone of the government’s defense in Afroyim.167 There, the
government had won in the lower courts on the line that an
164
See KOCHENOV, supra note 15, at 238 (“New Zealand, the absolute leader in this
field [of enfranchising non-citizen residents], allows any permanent resident to vote in the
national parliament elections. The UK goes further with the rights granted to the resident
citizens of Ireland or the Commonwealth: they not only vote, but they can also run for
office.”).
165
Id.
166
Id. at 221.
167
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 255 (1967); id. at 268–69 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
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American citizen voting in a foreign country implicated American
“foreign affairs” interests.168 Further, the justification against dual
citizenship in the Danish case rests on similar grounds that one who
votes in two different countries cannot honestly be assumed to have
either country’s interests fully at heart. 169 This sentiment continues
to underlie opposition to dual citizenship among scholars as well. 170
First, as expressed by the efforts off New Zealand and the
UK to expand voting rights to non-citizen residents, 171 it ought to be
recognized that the above view against dual voting is not the
majority view, particularly among Western countries from which
the original principles of citizenship spread and where liberalized
dual citizenship laws are now spreading. 172 Enfranchising dual
citizens, especially migrants who naturalize but also those who are
at-birth dual citizens, is one of the driving factors behind current
liberalizations of European and continental American dual
citizenship laws.173 In Italy, for example, seats in the legislature are
reserved for citizens who live abroad (who tend to be dual citizens)
to ensure that the diasporic community feels included in the political
process.174 In the United States, despite scholarly opposition, the
current law not only permits dual voting, but goes as far as to permit
holding office in a foreign country while retaining American
citizenship.175
In Japan, while prospective by-choice dual citizens are
barred from double voting on the basis of automatic expatriation, atbirth dual citizens between the ages of eighteen to twenty-two can
legally vote both in Japan and, where permitted, their other country
of citizenship. This is because the Public Offices Election Law, the
statute that sets the voting age, was amended in 2015 to lower the
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Id. at 255.
Sejersen, supra note 11, at 541–42.
170
See e.g., Dual Citizenship, Birthright Citizenship, and the Meaning of Sovereignty:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigr., Border Sec., and Claims of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1 (2005) (detailing several scholars who remain opposed to dual
citizenship on the grounds of conflicting loyalties, especially for those who vote or seek to
hold office in other countries).
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Id. at 534–35.
174
Id.
175
Murazumi, supra note 6, at 437–38.
169

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2022

466

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 17

requirement from twenty to eighteen.176 The law had been
previously amended in 1945 to lower the age from twenty-five to
twenty.177 This means, therefore, that during the deliberation and
implementation of the “election requirement” in the 1985
amendment to the Nationality Law which mandated at-birth dual
citizens to choose a citizenship at age twenty-two,178 the Diet was
aware (or at least should have been) that they were creating a
loophole permitting at-birth dual citizens to double vote. Lowering
the voting age again in 2015 after thirty years of dual citizens
exercising their double voting rights would have been an
opportunity for the Diet to revisit the election requirement to match
it with the voting age, yet they did not do so.
Further, the justification against such a proxy (akin to the
Danish) that the dual citizen voter would upset the national
electorate with insincere influence that might elect representatives
who will act counter to the national interest relies on the premise
that the dual citizen population is large enough to have such an
influence. The Japanese government has admitted that they have no
idea how many dual citizens there are, either living in Japan or
abroad.179 Attempts to do so are seen as “bureaucratic nightmares,”
which is part of the reason why the Nationality Law is rarely
enforced against current dual citizens. 180 Going by estimates, there
are roughly 518,000 Japanese who hold at least permanent
residency in a foreign country, but the number of dual citizens
within that group is unclear.181 Even assuming they are all dual
citizens of voting age, the dual citizen vote would only make up
0.004% of the population and slightly less than 0.005% of the
electorate.182 This small of a number, notwithstanding a large

176
Diet Enacts Law Lowering Voting Age to 18 from 20, THE JAPAN TIMES (June 17,
2015),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/17/national/politics-diplomacy/dietenacts-law-lowering-voting-age-18-20/ [https://perma.cc/F3W6-TPJW]
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Murazumi, supra note 6, at 421–22.
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Court Rules in Favor of Japan’s Ban on Dual Nationality, supra note 1.
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concentration of dual citizens in one electoral district, is unlikely to
have any independent, material impact on a Japanese election.
Restricting the right to vote through involuntary expatriation
of prospective by-choice dual citizens while permitting a proxy for
at-birth dual citizens, therefore, appears not to be based in a uniform
concern over electoral impacts of disloyal voters.
Instead,
recognizing that the prospective by-choice group primarily includes
migrant workers seeking to naturalize in Japan,183 the dual voting
justification against dual citizenship as-applied to these migrant
workers but not to ethnically half-Japanese at-birth dual citizens
reflects a conception of citizenship tied to ethnicity that is closely
held by the ruling political forces.184 In short, it seems that the
government has not kept the election requirement and the voting age
in sync because it presents a proxy only available to (partially)
ethnic Japanese, while complete restriction from voting to
naturalized Japanese citizens who would seek to retain their prior
citizenship keeps the non-Japanese out of the ballot box.

V.

CONCLUSION

While the Nationality Law today has undergone a series of
amendments since its adoption in 1950, both an objective look at the
text and at the conception of citizenship from their births out of
Western inspiration in the nineteenth century reveal little change. In
this way, both the legal and social constructs that make up a nation’s
conception of citizenship have not undergone fundamental changes
despite both domestic and international pressures on Japan to do so.
The gatekeeper to the rights and privileges of citizenship in Japan
continue to be ethnicity, and amendments in the Nationality Law
and subsequent shifts in who is accepted in the Japanese conception
of citizenship have all been in service of this basis on ethnicity.185
Therefore, while dual citizenship continues to be prohibited by the
Nationality Law, proxies permit ethnically Japanese dual citizens to
‘count’ both socially and legally, particularly when it comes to
voting. This is at the expense of non-citizen residents who arguably
183
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184
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185
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may be more invested and impacted by the outcome of an election
than non-resident Japanese citizens, but Japan’s conception of
citizenship makes the line clear—citizenship is for Japanese only.
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